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The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equi-
libria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies
in the context of a fixed dependency graph for pay-off functions. A logical system describing prop-
erties of functional dependence for any given graph is proposed and is proven to be complete.
1 Introduction
Functional Dependence. In this paper we study dependency between players’ strategies in Nash equi-
libria. For example, the coordination game described by Table 1 has two Nash equilibria: (a1,b1) and
(a2,b2). Knowing the strategy of player a in a Nash equilibrium of this game, one can predict the strategy
of player b. We say that player a functionally determines player b and denote this by aBb.
b1 b2
a1 1,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,1
Table 1: Coordination Game
Note that in the case of the coordination game, we also have bBa.
However, for the game described by Table 2 statement aBb is true, but
bBa is false.
The main focus of this paper is functional dependence in multi-
player games. For example, consider a “parity” game with three play-
ers a, b, c. Each of the players picks 0 or 1, and all players are rewarded
if the sum of all three numbers is even. This game has four different
Nash equilibria: (0,0,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,1), and (1,1,0). It is easy to see that knowledge of any two
players’ strategies in a Nash equilibrium reveals the third. Thus, using our notation, for example a,bBc.
At the same time, ¬(aB c).
b1 b2
a1 1,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,1
a3 1,1 0,0
Table 2: Strategic Game
As another example, consider a game between three players in
which each player picks 0 or 1 and all players are rewarded if they
have chosen the same strategy. This game has only two Nash equilib-
ria: (0,0,0) and (1,1,1). Thus, knowledge of the strategy of player a
in a Nash equilibrium reveals the strategies of the two other players.
We write this as aBb,c.
Functional dependence as a relation has been studied previously,
especially in the context of database theory. Armstrong [1] presented the following sound and complete
axiomatization of this relation:
1. Reflexivity: ABB, if B⊆ A,
2. Augmentation: ABB→ A,CBB,C,
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3. Transitivity: ABB→ (BBC→ ABC),
where here and everywhere below A,B denotes the union of sets A and B. The above axioms are known
in database literature as Armstrong’s axioms [5]. Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [2] suggested a variation of
Armstrong’s axioms that describe properties of multi-valued dependence.
Dependency Graphs. As a side result, we will show that the logical system formed by the Armstrong
axioms is sound and complete with respect to the strategic game semantics. Our main result, however, is
a sound and complete axiomatic system for the relation B in games with a given dependency graph.
Dependency graphs [7, 8, 4, 3] put restrictions on the pay-off functions that can be used in the game.
For example, dependency graph Γ1 depicted in Figure 1, specifies that the pay-off function of player a
only can depend on the strategy of player b in addition to the strategy of player a himself. The pay-off
function for player b can only depend on the strategies of players a and c in addition to the strategy of
player b himself, etc.
a b c d
Figure 1: Dependency Graph Γ1
An example of a game over graph Γ1 is a game between play-
ers a, b, c, and d in which these players choose real numbers as
their strategies. The pay-off function of players a and d is the
constant 0. Player b is rewarded if his value is equal to the mean
of the values of players a and c. Player c is rewarded if his value is equal to the mean of the values of
players b and d. Thus, Nash equilibria of this game are all quadruples (a,b,c,d) such that 2b = a+ c
and 2c = b+d. Hence, in this game a,bB c,d and a,cBb,d, but ¬(aBb).
Note that although the statement a,bBc,d is true for the game described above, it is not true for many
other games with the same dependency graph Γ1. In this paper we study properties of functional depen-
dence that are common to all games with the same dependency graph. An example of such statement for
the graph Γ1, as we will show in Proposition 1, is aBd→ b,cBd.
a b c d
Figure 2: Dependency Graph Γ2
Informally, this property is true for any game over graph Γ1
because any dependencies between players a and d must be es-
tablished through players b and c. This intuitive approach, how-
ever, does not always lead to the right conclusion. For example,
in graph Γ2 depicted in Figure 2, players b and c also separate
players a and d. Thus, according to the same intuition, the state-
ment aBd→ b,cBd must also be true for any game over graph
Γ2. This, however, is not true. Consider, for example, a game in
which all four players have three strategies: rock, paper, and scissors. The pay-off function of players a
and d is the constant 0. If a and d pick the same strategy, then neither b nor c is paid. If players a and d
pick different strategies, then players b and c are paid according to the rules of the standard rock-paper-
scissors game. In this game Nash equilibrium is only possible if a and d pick the same strategy. Hence,
aB d. At the same time, in any such equilibria b and c can have any possible combination of values.
Thus, ¬(b,cBd). Therefore, the statement aBd→ b,cBd is not true for this game.
a b c
Figure 3: Dependency Graph Γ3
As our final example, consider the graph Γ3 depicted in Fig-
ure 3. We will show that aB c→ bB c is not true for at least one
game over graph Γ3. Indeed, consider the game in which players
a,b, and c use real numbers as possible strategies. Players a and c
have a constant pay-off of 0. The pay-off of the player b is equal to 0 if players a and c choose the same
real number. Otherwise, it is equal to the number chosen by the player b himself. Note that in any Nash
equilibrium of this game, the strategies of players a and c are equal. Therefore, aB c, but ¬(bB c).
The main result of this paper is a sound and complete axiomatization of all properties of functional
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dependence for any given dependency graph. This result is closely related to work by More and Naumov
on functional dependence of secrets over hypergraphs [9]. However, the logical system presented in this
paper is significantly different from theirs. A similar relation of “rational” functional dependence without
any connection to dependency graphs has been axiomatized by Naumov and Nicholls [10].
The counterexample that we have constructed for the game in Figure 3 significantly relies on the fact
that player b has infinitely many strategies. However, in this paper we show completeness with respect
to the semantics of finite games, making the result stronger.
2 Syntax and Semantics
The graphs that we consider in this paper contain no loops, multiple edges, or directed edges.
Definition 1 For any set of vertices U of a graph (V,E), borderB(U) is the set
{v ∈U | (v,w) ∈ E for some w ∈V \U}.
A cut (U,W ) of a graph (V,E) is a partition U unionsqW of the set V . For any vertex v in a graph, by Ad j(v)
we mean the set of all vertices adjacent to v. By Ad j+(v) we mean the set Ad j(v)∪{v}.
Definition 2 For any graph Γ = (V,E), by Φ(Γ) we mean the minimal set of formulas such that (i)
⊥ ∈Φ(Γ), (ii) ABB ∈Φ(Γ) for each A⊆V and B⊆V , (iii) φ → ψ ∈Φ(Γ) for each φ ,ψ ∈Φ(Γ).
Definition 3 By game over graph Γ = (V,E) we mean any strategic game G = (V,{Sv}v∈V ,{uv}v∈V )
such that (i) The finite set of players in the game is the set of vertices V , (ii) The finite set of strategies
Sv of any player v is an arbitrary set, (iii) The pay-off function uv of any player v only depends on the
strategies of the players in Ad j+(v).
By NE(G) we denote the set of all Nash equilibria in the game G. The next definition is the core definition
of this paper. The second item in the list below gives a precise meaning of the functional dependence
predicate ABB.
Definition 4 For any game G over graph Γ and any φ ∈Φ(Γ), we define binary relation G φ as follows
(i) G 2 ⊥, (ii) G  ABB if s =A t implies s =B t for each s, t ∈ NE(G), (iii) G  ψ1→ ψ2 if G 2 ψ1 or
G  ψ2, where here and everywhere below 〈sv〉v∈V =X 〈tv〉v∈V means that sx = tx for each x ∈ X.
3 Axioms
The following is the set of axioms of our logical system. It consists of the original Armstrong axioms
and an additional Contiguity axiom that captures properties of functional dependence specific to a given
graph Γ.
1. Reflexivity: ABB, where B⊆ A
2. Augmentation: ABB→ A,CBB,C
3. Transitivity: ABB→ (BBC→ ABC)
4. Contiguity: A,BBC→B(U),B(W ),BBC, where (U,W ) is a cut of the graph such that A ⊆U
and C ⊆W .
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Note that the Contiguity axiom, unlike the Gateway axiom [9], effectively requires “double layer” divider
B(U),B(W ) between sets A and C. This is because in our setting values are assigned to the vertices and
not to the edges of the graph.
We write `Γ φ if φ ∈Φ(Γ) is provable from the combination of the axioms above and propositional
tautologies in the language Φ(Γ) using the Modus Ponens inference rule. We write X `Γ φ if φ is
provable using the additional set of axioms X . We often omit the parameter Γ when its value is clear
from the context.
Lemma 1 ` ABC→ A,BBC.
Proof. Assume ABC. By the Reflexivity axiom, A,BBA. Thus, by the Transitivity axiom, A,BBC. 
4 Examples
In this section we give examples of proofs in our formal system. The soundness and the completeness of
this system will be shown in the appendix.
Proposition 1 `Γ1 aBd→ b,cBd, where Γ1 is the graph depicted in Figure 1.
Proof. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ1 such that U = {a,b} and W = {c,d}. Thus, B(U) = {b}
andB(W ) = {c}. Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom, aBd→ b,cBd. 
Proposition 2 `Γ1 a,cBd→ (d,bBa→ b,cBa,d), where Γ1 is the graph depicted in Figure 1.
Proof. Assume that a,cBd and d,bBa. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ1 such that U = {a,b} and
W = {c,d}. Thus, B(U) = {b} and B(W ) = {c}. Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom with A = {a},
B = {c}, and C = {d}, a,cBd→ b,cBd. Thus,
b,cBd. (1)
by the first assumption. Similarly, using the second assumption, b,cB a. Hence, by the Augmentation
axiom,
b,cBa,b,c. (2)
Thus, from statement (1) by the Augmentation axiom, a,b,cBa,d. Finally, using statement (2) and the
Transitivity axiom, b,cBa,d. 
Proposition 3 `Γ4 a,cB e→ b,c,dB e, where Γ4 is the graph depicted in Figure 4.
a b c d e
Figure 4: Dependency Graph Γ4
Proof. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ4
such that U = {a,b,c} and W = {d,e}. Thus,
B(U) = {b,c} and B(W ) = {d}. There-
fore, a,c B e → b,c,d B e by the Contigu-
ity axiom with A = {a}, B = {c}, and C =
{e}. 
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Proposition 4 `Γ5 aBb→ (bB c→ (cBa→ d,e, f Ba,b,c)), where Γ5 is depicted in Figure 5.
Proof. Assume aB b, bB c, and cB a. Consider cut (U,W ) of the graph Γ5 such that U = {c, f} and
W = {a,b,d,e}. Thus, B(U) = { f} and B(W ) = {d,e}. Therefore, by the Contiguity axiom with
A = {c}, B =∅, and C = {a}, cBa→ d,e, f Ba. Hence, d,e, f Ba by the third assumption. Similarly,
one can show d,e, f B b, and d,e, f B c. By applying the Augmentation axiom to the last three state-
ments, d,e, f Ba,d,e, f , and a,d,e, f Ba,b,d,e, f , and a,b,d,e, f Ba,b,c. Therefore, d,e, f Ba,b,c by
the Transitivity axiom applied twice. 
c
f
d e
ba
Figure 5: Dependency Graph Γ5
Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 are special cases of a more
general principle. We will say that a subset of vertices is sparse if
the shortest path between any two vertices in this subset contains
at least three edges. The general principle states that if W is a
sparse subset of vertices in the graph (V,E) and each vertex w ∈
W is functionally determined by the set V \ {w}, then the subset
V \W functionally determines the subset W :∧
w∈W
((V \{w}))Bw→ (V \W )BW.
For example, the set {a,d} in the graph Γ1 depicted in Figure 1
is sparse. Due to the general principle, a,b,cB d → (d,c,bB a→ b,cB a,d). Thus, by Lemma 1,
a,cBd→ (d,bBa→ b,cBa,d), which is the statement of Proposition 2. In the case of Proposition 4,
the sparse set is {a,b,c}. The proof of the general principle is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.
5 Soundness
In this section, we prove soundness of our logical system by proving soundness of each of our four
axioms. The proof of completeness can be found in [6].
Lemma 2 (reflexivity) G  ABB for each game G over a graph Γ= (V,E) and each B⊆ A⊆V .
Proof. For any s, t ∈ NE(G), if s =A t, then s =B t because A⊆ B. 
Lemma 3 (augmentation) If G  ABB, then G  A,CBB,C for each game G over a graph Γ= (V,E)
and each A,B,C ⊆V .
Proof. Suppose that G  ABB and consider any s, t ∈ NE(G) such that s =A,C t. We will show that
s =B,C t. Indeed, s =A,C t implies that s =A t and s =C t. Thus, s =B t by the assumption G  ABB.
Therefore, s =B,C t. 
Lemma 4 (transitivity) If G  ABB and G  BBC, then G  ABC for each game G over a graph
Γ= (V,E) and each A,B,C ⊆V .
Proof. Suppose that G  ABB and G  BBC. Consider any s, t ∈ NE(G) such that s =A t. We will
show that s =C t. Indeed, s =B t due to the first assumption. Hence, by the second assumption, s =C t. 
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Lemma 5 (contiguity) If G  A,BBC, then G B(S),B(T ),BBC, for each game G = (V,E) over a
graph Γ, each cut (U,W ) of Γ, and each A⊆U, B⊆V , and C ⊆W.
Proof. Suppose that G  A,BBC. Consider any s = 〈sv〉v∈V ∈ NE(G) and t = 〈tv〉v∈V ∈ NE(G) such
that s =B(U),B(W ),B t. We will prove that s =C t. Indeed, consider strategy profile e = 〈ev〉v∈V such that
ev =
{
sv if v ∈U ,
tv if v ∈W .
We will first prove that e ∈ NE(G). Assuming the opposite, let v ∈ V be a player in the game G that
can increase his pay-off by changing strategy in profile e. Without loss of generality, let v ∈U . Then,
e =Ad j(v)∪{v} s. Thus, player v can also increase his pay-off by changing strategy in profile s, which is a
contradiction with the choice of s ∈ NE(G).
Note that e =U,B s and e =W,B t. Thus, e =A,B s and e =C s. Hence, e =C s by the assumption
G  A,BBC. Therefore, s =C e =C t. 
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a sound and complete logical system for functional dependence in
strategic games over a fixed dependency graph. The dependency graph puts restrictions on the type of
pay-off functions that can be used in the game. If no such restrictions are imposed, then the logical
system for functional dependence in strategic games is just the set of original Armstrong axioms. This
statement follows from our results since the absence of restrictions corresponds to the case of a complete
(in the graph theory sense) dependency graph. In the case of a complete graph, the Contiguity axiom
follows from the Armstrong axioms because for any cut (U,W ), the set B(U)∪B(W ) is the set of all
vertices in the graph.
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